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Good Governance Model in Tehran City Islamic Council

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Abstract

This paper aims at studying governance and distribution of autonomies in Tehran City Islamic Council in the process of performing intra/inter-organizational functions. According to current theories on governance, there are three types of governance according to the kind of involvement. Authority involvement, interactive involvement and persuasion involvement, in Tehran City Islamic Council in the process of forming and implementing urban regulations. On the other hand, Tehran City Islamic Council could have three kinds of autonomies to be effective: autogeny, heterogeny and discretion. Good governance model for Tehran City Islamic Council is an optimized combination of involvements and autonomies designed by polling the elites a mathematical model analysis. To study the current governance status in Tehran City Islamic Council, a questionnaire is used and the interval is estimated by single T-test. The findings indicate that in terms of involvement and autonomy, Tehran City Islamic Council has a remarkable distance from optimized governance model.

Keywords: *good governance, authority involvement, transactional involvement, persuasion involvement, autonomy, autogeny, heterogeny, discretion micro setting*

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Introduction

In recent years, governance is introduced as a thought paradigm and a tool to run governments (Dabagh, 2009: 13). Governance is raised as the basis for establishing democracy in developed countries and to assess the performance and frameworks of governance as well as optimizing these patterns, a plenty of studies are conducted (Coffman, 2007: 21). Governance is the result of relations between major parts of a country in management process which involves three sections including government, private sector and civil society (United Nations Development Program, 1995). In each sector, type and quality or relations with other sectors determines the quality of governance (Necla, 2008: 30). The aim of governance is to create compatibility between different and conflicted interests so that one can generate right way of management through their interactions and it can be clarified that how different interests are centralized by such decisions and achieve homogeneity (Weiss, 2013: 5). It requires capacity building in policymaking, local governance, ruling board's obligation to values, ethicality and resolving the problems and challenges (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2003: 12). In development process, the necessity to establish rational relations and interactions among public entities and civil society is undeniable so that determining measures to calibrate governance has become a tool to measure people's contribution and democracy level in developed countries (Randall, 2005: 54). Contemporary to governance theory generation in international level, such organizations as World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and others analyzed the aspects and indicators of governance in different countries and provided governments with approaches on democratization process. Upon raising theories on democratizing governmental affairs, governance was recognized as an approach on democracy establishment and many developed nations designed governance models and paradigms in different levels commensurate to their political conditions

and ambience (Jasbi and Nafari, 2009: 6). In the end of 1980s, a new paradigm was shaped by World Bank in developed countries, called "good governance", used as basis to help developing countries upon extensions in independent organizations (Landman, 2003: 15). Good governance was formed in governance context where different aspects are defined in the light of described relations and interactions based on three roles of government, private sector and civil society (Nafari, 2008: 34). Concerning good governance, there are different approaches on democratizing the governments by which different hallmarks are introduced and clarified (Jasbi and Nafari, 2009: 12). In local level, governance means to create effective relations between local entities such as municipalities, city councils, national governments, private sectors and NGOs to run them better and more effectively aimed at attracting people's contribution and improving the relations between local and national governments (UNDP, 2007). To recognize the measures of good governance in local governments, it is necessary to identify relevant measures through the opinions and studies by public affairs running connoisseurs by which one can expound variables and the aspects of the problem. In different levels of entities and their relationships, various theories are raised that have shaped the role and relations of governance elements by considering broad aspects of effective variables in political system in which major theories have been effective in formulating theoretical basics and main questions expressed briefly in below: In one theory by Lindblom, governance is the process of policymaking and its execution in the most desired situation by which governance has three processes including input, processing and content (output). In this theory, government is the nexus of governance network and private sector and civil society communicate it (Lindblom, 1977: 130). In their book "policy execution", Michael Hill and Peter Hupe used Lindblom as the basis of their own theory and considered two kinds of relations for govern-

ment: horizontal relations: relationship between the government and entities, parties, private sector and civil society. Vertical relations: relationship between government and political system, policymakers and policy executors who introduce the way of using the government as the same governance (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 174). By pointing out Linblom's theory on governance as well as Etzioni's theory, they introduce governance as a cycle of power (remunerative power, coercive power, normative power) based on the aims of the state which includes directive aim to create plausible structures; economic aim to create welfare structures and relationship with business sector; and persuasion aim to create value and ethical structures and final political- social relations by which inter-organizational political- administrative- relations system as well as executive systems are established in street level (Etzioni, 1961: 76).

In other theory by Fred Riggs in his article "the idea of development administration" was on the relationship between the elements of public system and environment (Riggs, 1976). In this article, administrative and governmental entities have a scope of freedom and autonomy in doing their functions and the overall aim of the system is to establish balance and interaction among administrative entities including government, Parliament, Judiciary and public organs to achieve development. By asserting that in a political system, interaction between political entities and socio-political environment requires autonomies so that these entities can play their role in development process through creating an effective ambience, Riggs believes that public administration is influential on development when their transactional yield to results inside and outside their environments which cause changes toward growth (Riggs, 1976: 27). To create such changes, an transactional network is constituted which is affected by the role of entity and activity defined by considering its aims and functions in political system. For instance, in a political system in which there are government, Judiciary and

executive power, each entity should interact and do its functions based on its defined role which would yield to three functions for them: (1) generating inter-organizational relations; (2) conducting defines functions; and (3) creating organizational power (Riggs, 1976: 29).

Riggs asserts that each mentioned entity needs autonomies to conduct its tasks. This autonomy has certain elements: autogenic which indicates the autonomy of an administrative organ in doing its organizational functions; heterogenic which indicates the autonomy of an administrative organ in political system to interact with other entities in political system; and discretion which indicated that impact by an administrative organ on environment to create effectiveness or change and development (Riggs, 1976: 35). Since in administrative theories, interactions between government and private sector and civil society are raised and the extent of such interactions means that their relations are to achieve a level of good governance so one can conclude that a certain level of autonomy in political system would yield to good relations by which governance theories are formed. As a result, considered variables and factors in present research are extracted from Riggs' theory on environmental interactions (combination of autonomy) and Etzioni's theory on involvements by local government and using power in urban lawmaking process (three involvements) shaped by good governance theory.

Question: has Tehran Islamic City Council acted successfully in performing its mission? Evidences indicate that the response is negative. To achieve a rational and reliable response, a model is designed here by which these questions are answered: what is the benchmark for the success of Tehran Islamic City Council to conduct its functions ideally? How are current conditions of Tehran Islamic City Council in performing its missions? As a result, a fundamental question is "as a political system, which combination of power and autonomy should be used by Tehran Islamic City Council to con-



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duct good governance?

2.Literature Review

In development program, the United Nations conducted many studies in different developing countries to measure good governance since 2002 and it introduced good governance by four key values including responsiveness, effectiveness, justice and contribution. It has measured these indicators in many developing nations including Afghanistan, Ghana, Brazil, Madagascar, etc. It has also provided sub-indices for each mentioned indicator that highly helps to measure good governance indicators operationally.

In 1994, World Bank introduced good governance hallmarks as contribution, collective unity, responsiveness, transparency, accountability, efficiency, effective, law orientation and justice. European United believes that good governance indicators include equality and fairness, law preference, independent judicial system and transparency. In 2003, it provided more complete indicators: respecting human rights, democratization, law orientation, promoting civil society, modifying public affairs and decentralization. It believes that democratization and respecting human rights are the main elements of good governance.

In 2000, OECD issued a declaration and introduced good governance indicators as law orientation, public sector powerful management, transparency, responsiveness through improving accounting operation and budgeting, public expenditure management and fighting against corruption. UN Social and Economic Committee in Asia and Oceania provided broader aspects on good governance in developing countries: responsiveness, transparency, responsibility, justice, social orientation, contribution, law orientation, efficiency and effectiveness as the key factors of governance. In other studies on good governance indicators by emphasis on the role of civil society and the impact by people on government and good governance, State is introduced as an affecting element on good governance and such studies

are under urban governance arena:

In its annual report, African Urban Management Institute defines main influencing factors on urban governance as fair and free elections, free media and expression, fighting against corruption and public balanced services. Tokyo Institute of Technology has defined the combination of State and civil society (social and economic activists, society – based entities, official/unofficial groups, media and so on) as the benchmark of good governance in all levels. According to University of Technology Sydney-Center for Local Government, good governance is defined as promoting sustainable human development. In his paper titled “Explaining the Mixed of Municipal Governance of Forest in Bolivia” Krister Anderson (2002) provided important hallmarks of good governance including public and organizational learning, responsiveness and synchronization among urban entities (council and municipality) with other public organs. Ultimately, responsiveness and synchronization in good governance model in Bolivia are introduced as the most important factors. In her study, Nafari provided a comprehensive governance model in national level based on systems general theory, ethics philosophy model, public sector governance communication network, civil society, private sector, development and sustainable development theories, managing development by modern organ orientation approaches in two aspects. In this research, governance has two effectiveness and efficiency aspects with their own indicators in political effectiveness – social effectiveness, sociopolitical efficiency – economic efficiency and bureaucratic efficiency (Jasbi and Nafari, 2008).

In his study, Malekipour (2009) studied good governance and its correlation to sustainable urban development in Isfahan (local level). He studied good governance indicators and their impact on sustainable development and he selected the aspects of good governance from UNODP which included law governance, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness,

Weight	Type of governance	(Tehran Islamic City Council (42 functions	Functions
7	Authority	Attracting citizens' contribution	Socio cul- ture
7	Authority	Youths' affairs	
8	Authority	Social security	
7	Transactional	Creating citizenship justice	
7	Authority	Training development	
7	Transactional	Organizing charities and NGOs	
7	Persuasion	Women's affairs	
8	Authority	Paying entrepreneurship loans	
8	Transactional	Job development and planning to decrease unem- ployment	
7	Persuasion	Protecting urban persuasion heritage	
10	Authority	Developing artistic spaces, cinemas, persuasion cen- ters and museums	
8	Persuasion	Institutionalizing Iranian Islamic culture	
8	Authority	Keeping and disseminating urban ethicality	
9	Transactional	Sport development	
8	Authority	Enhancing urban small businesses and industries	Economic and budget- ing plan
7	Transactional	Generating new jobs	
7	Transactional	Enhancing entrepreneurship	
7	Transactional	Organizing businesses economically	
8	Transactional	Investment attraction	
8	Transactional	Approving fees and service prices and controlling rent rates	
8	Authority	Aiding business integration	
7	Authority	Monitoring commercial contracts of municipality	Urban ser- vices and environ- ment
7	Transactional	Security and crisis management	
8	Transactional	Providing urban services	
7	Transactional	Protecting gardens and green landscape	Construc- tion, traffic and trans- portation
7	Transactional	Transportation, traffic, technical and constructional planning	
7	Transactional	Devising operational, technical and constructional annual plans	
7	Authority	Monitoring on well execution of constructional proj- ects by municipality	
8	Authority	Utilizing stat-of-the-art technologies in urban con- structions	
7	Transactional	Using ITC in transportation and traffic control	Urban health
7	Transactional	Water and food refinement	
7	Transactional	Devising health standards	
6	Transactional	Health culture and training	
8	Persuasion	Health and family	
7	Persuasion	Research in health field	
8	Transactional	Controlling the wastes and urban cleanliness	
8	Transactional	Controlling water, air, sewage and soil pollution	

▲ Table 3.1: type and extent of good governance; elites' concurrence

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7	Transactional	Fighting against diseases	
6	Authority	Developing sustainable energies	
8	Authority	Cooperating with political organs and parties	Gover- nance
8	Authority	Cooperating with mass media	
8	Authority	Relationship with central government	

Row	Autonomy	Desired extent
1	Autogeny	25
2	Heterogeny	25
3	Discretion	50
	Total	100

▲Table 2.3: desired autonomy combination (Bohluli, 2009) current

contribution and equality. In his analysis, he studied the impacts of good governance on urban services, attracting investments, risk management, safety performance and budgeting in urban management and he suggested strategies to execute good governance in the municipalities of different regions in Isfahan.

3.Methodology

Present study has provided a model on governance in local governments by an exploratory approach and by combining two well – known theories by Riggs and Lindblom. In terms of audience, it is a fundamental study and its population consists of all main and substitute members of Tehran Islamic City Council, managers of commissions groups and elites ($n = 86$) who were selected 70 by Morgan table. Data collection method was Mix Method. Delphi Method is used to gather the opinions of elites and concurrence and then good governance model was devised. In the next step, power exertion (governance) to recognize current status of Tehran Islamic City Council and autonomy distribution is used to maximize spatial effectiveness in a descriptive – survey (qualitative). Answers by elites on the amount and type of governance are outlined as below.

To identify the extent of desired autonomy distribution, since a similar research was conducted by Nader Bohluli (2009) in Tabriz Islamic City Council, the same value was used as

a benchmark in present research:

According to findings, Fuzzy analysis technique and MATLAB software package are used to model and draw the relevant paradigm. Extracted mathematical model is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 MAX Z &= C_1x_1 + C_2x_2 + C_3x_3 \\
 MAX W &= y_1 + y_2 + y_3 \\
 a_1 &\leq y_1 \leq b_1 \\
 a_2 &\leq y_1 \leq b_2 \\
 a_3 &\leq y_1 \leq b_3 \\
 x_1 + x_2 + x_3 &= 1 \\
 y_1 + y_2 + y_3 &\leq 1 \\
 x_1, x_2, x_3 &\in \{0, 1\} \\
 y_1, y_2, y_3 &\geq 0
 \end{aligned}$$

Optimization terminated.

$$x = \text{ans} = 0.0000 \quad 1.0000 \quad 0.0000$$

$$y = \text{ans} = 0.2500 \quad 0.2500 \quad 0.5000$$

Output of the software indicates that for model optimization, the amount of involvement (governance type) can be only one of these three moods. Autonomy distribution can be 100 in maximum namely 25 for autogenic autonomy, 25 for heterogenic autonomy and 50 for discrete autonomy. According to achieved mathematical model by fuzzy analysis, a questioner based on governance type and autonomy distribution was devised and distributed in research population in order to measure the model in real conditions. Questionnaire reliability was assessed by Cronbach's alpha value. All research variables had admirable reliability and their Cronbach's alpha values were greater than 0.70. Cronbach's alpha value was 0.89 for involvement and 0.85 for autonomy. These values are greater than 0.70 for all aspects of autonomy and involvement which indicate that questionnaire reliability is supported. In present study, all data were analyzed by SPSS software package.

4. Findings

Single T-test is used to compare each task with optimized value. Single t-test is used when we have one sample of the population and we plan to compare a standard mood with an expected and hypothetical figure (Meyers, Garino, 2012: 106). In this test, sample mean is compared with optimized value (25).

4.1. Autogeny components

Socio culture aspect

The results from comparing socio-persuasion aspects and its 15 indicators with optimized values are shown in table 4.1. The findings indicate that sample mean in all socio-persuasion aspect (total mean) is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from it significantly ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in socio-persuasion indicators.

Plan, budget and economy aspect


The results show that population's mean in all indicators of plan, budget and economy aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in plan, budget and economy aspect.

Urban services and environment aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of urban services and environment aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in urban services and environment aspect.


Construction, transportation and traffic aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of construction, transportation and traffic aspect is lower than optimized value (25)



▲ Table 4.1: one sample t-test to compare the tasks of socio-culture aspect and optimized value (25) in autogenic component


▲ Figure 4.1: comparing socio-persuasion indicators with optimized value



▲ Table 4.2: one sample t-test to compare the tasks of plan, budget and economy aspect and optimized value (25) in autogenic component

▲ Figure 4.2: comparing plan, budget and economy indicators with optimized value


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	23.11	64	7.83	2.73	17.17	Total mean



▲ Table 4.3: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of urban services and environment aspect and optimized value (25) in autogenic component

▲ Figure 4.3: comparing urban services and environment indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	22.23	64	7.21	2.61	17.79	Total mean



▲ Table 4.4: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of construction, transportation and traffic aspect and optimized value (25) in autogenic component

▲ Figure 4.4: comparing construction, transportation and traffic indicators with optimized value

and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in construction, transportation and traffic aspect.

Urban health aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of urban health aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in urban health aspect.

Governance aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of governance aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in

governance aspect.

4.2.Heterogeny component


Socio culture aspect

The findings indicate that sample mean in all socio-persuasion aspect (total mean) is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from it significantly ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in socio-persuasion indicators.

Plan, budget and economy aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of plan, budget and economy aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in plan, budget and economy aspect.


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	23.80	64	8.32	2.82	16.67	Total mean



▲ Table 4.5: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of urban health aspect and optimized value (25) in autogenic component

▲ Figure 4.5: comparing urban health indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	16.35	64	8.13	3.95	16.87	Total mean



▲ Table 4.6: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of governance aspect and optimized value (25) in autogenic component

▲ Figure 4.6: comparing governance indicators with optimized value

Urban services and environment aspect:

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of urban services and environment aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in urban services and environment aspect.

Construction, transportation and traffic aspect

The results of comparing construction, transportation and traffic aspect and its 5 indicators are outlined in table 4.10. The results show that population's mean in all indicators of construction, transportation and traffic aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in construction, transportation and traffic aspect.

Urban health aspect:


The results show that population's mean in all indicators of urban health aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in urban health aspect.

Governance aspect

The results of comparing governance and its three indicators with optimized value are reported in table 4.12. The results show that population's mean in all indicators of governance aspect is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in governance aspect.

Table 4.12: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of governance aspect and optimized val-


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	15.79	64	7.11	3.65	17.89	Total mean



▲ Table 4.7: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of sociopersuasion aspect and optimized value (25) in heterogenic component

▲ Figure 4.7: comparing socio-persuasion indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	16.35	64	6.95	3.44	18.05	Total mean



▲ Table 4.8: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of plan, budget and economy aspect and optimized value (25) in heterogenic component

▲ Figure 4.8: comparing plan, budget and economy indicators with optimized value

ue (25) in heterogenic component

4.3. Discretion component

Socio culture aspect

The findings indicate that sample mean in all sociopersuasion aspect (total mean) is lower than optimized value (25) and differs from it significantly ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in sociopersuasion indicators.

Plan, budget and economy aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of plan, budget and economy aspect is lower than optimized value (50) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in plan, budget and economy aspect.

Table 4.14: one sample t – test to compare the

tasks of plan, budget and economy aspect and optimized value (50) in discrete component


Urban services and environment aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of urban services and environment aspect (total mean) is lower than optimized value (50) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in urban services and environment aspect.

Construction, transportation and traffic aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of construction, transportation and traffic aspect (total mean) is lower than optimized value (50) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in construc-


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	16.25	64	6.96	3.47	18.04	Total mean



▲ Table 4.9: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of urban services and environment aspect and optimized value (25) in heterogenic component

▲ Figure 4.9: comparing urban services and environment indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	14.99	64	7.29	3.94	17.71	Total mean



▲ Table 4.10: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of construction, transportation and traffic aspect and optimized value (25) in heterogenic component

▲ Figure 4.10: comparing construction, transportation and traffic indicators with optimized value

tion, transportation and traffic aspect.

Urban health aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of urban health aspect is lower than optimized value (50) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in urban health aspect.

Governance aspect

The results show that population's mean in all indicators of governance aspect is lower than optimized value (50) and differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$). It shows statistical difference between real and optimized values in governance aspect.

Socio culture aspect:

The findings indicate that population's mean is lower than optimized value in all indicators except than tasks 7 and 10 and it significantly


differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$) which shows a significant difference between real and optimized values in the indicators of socio culture aspect. The mean of tasks 7 and 10 has no difference with optimized value.

Plan, budget and economy aspect:

The findings indicate that population's mean is lower than optimized value in all tasks and it significantly differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$) which shows a significant difference between real and optimized values in the indicators of plan, budget and economy aspect.

The results show that all 8 tasks of plan, budget and economy aspect have significance difference with optimized value. In other words, there are significantly lower than optimized level ($p < 0.01$). The highest difference with optimized level includes tasks 21, 19 and 20 with mean difference of 1.95, 1.83 and 1.80


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	20.18	64	7.68	3.87	17.32	Total mean



▲ Table 4.11: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of urban health aspect and optimized value (25) in heterogenic component

▲ Figure 4.11: comparing urban health indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	15.82	64	7.67	3.87	17.33	Total mean



▲ Table 4.12: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of governance aspect and optimized value (25) in heterogenic component

▲ Figure 4.12: comparing governance indicators with optimized value

respectively.

Urban services and environment aspect

The findings indicate that population's mean is lower than optimized value in all tasks and it significantly differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$) which shows a significant difference between real and optimized values in the indicators of urban services and environment aspect. The results show that 3 tasks of urban services and environment aspect have significance difference with optimized value. In other words, there are significantly lower than optimized level ($p < 0.01$). The highest difference with optimized level includes tasks 24, 26 and 25 with mean difference of 1.92, 0.98 and 0.63 respectively.

Construction, transportation and traffic aspect


The findings indicate that population's mean is lower than optimized value in all tasks and it

significantly differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$) which shows a significant difference between real and optimized values in the indicators of construction, transportation and traffic aspect. The results show that 5 tasks of construction, transportation and traffic aspect have significance difference with optimized value. In other words, there are significantly lower than optimized level ($p < 0.01$). The highest difference with optimized level includes tasks 29, 30 and 31 with mean difference of 1.71, 0.93 and 0.92 respectively.

Urban health aspect

The findings indicate that population's mean is lower than optimized value in all tasks except than task 33 and it significantly differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$) which shows a significant difference between real and optimized values in the indicators of urban health aspect. Task 33 has no difference with optimized val-


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	25.61	64	23.59	7.59	26.41	Total mean



▲ Table 4.13: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of sociopersuasion aspect and optimized value (25) in discrete component

▲ Figure 4.13: comparing sociopersuasion indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	24.97	64	22.54	7.45	27.44	Total mean



▲ Table 4.14: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of plan, budget and economy aspect and optimized value (50) in discrete component

▲ Figure 4.14: comparing urban services and environment indicators with optimized value

ue. The results show that 7 of 8 tasks of urban health aspect have significance difference with optimized value. In other words, there are significantly lower than optimized level ($p < 0.01$). The highest difference with optimized level includes tasks 34, 39 and 36 with mean difference of 2.45, 1.98 and 1.93 respectively. Table 4.23: single sample t – test to compare urban health aspect and optimized value in involvement


Governance aspect

The findings indicate that population's mean is lower than optimized value in all tasks except

than task 40 and it significantly differs from optimized value ($P < 0.01$) which shows a significant difference between real and optimized values in the indicators of governance aspect. Task 40 has no difference with optimized value. The results show that 2 of 3 tasks of governance aspect have significance difference with optimized value. In other words, there are significantly lower than optimized level ($p < 0.01$).

Task (number and type) Mean SD Optimized level Mean difference T-value Sig
40. authority 5085 1.65 6 0.15 0.659 P = 0.513


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	24.83	64	22.26	7.39	27.74	Total mean



▲ Table 4.15: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of urban services and environment aspect and optimized value (50) in discrete component

▲ Figure 4.15: comparing urban health indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	23.85	64	22.94	7.93	27.06	Total mean



▲ Table 4.16: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of construction, transportation and traffic aspect and optimized value (50) in discrete component

▲ Figure 4.16: comparing construction, transportation and traffic indicators with optimized value

41. authority 5.94 1.70 8 2.06 9.04 P < 0.001

42. authority 5.87 1.74 8 2.13 9.67 P < 0.001

In above figure, concerning achieved model by fuzzy analysis and results from research population, the difference between current and optimized condition in Tehran Islamic City Council in terms of governance (type and amount of involvement) is shown. As seen, the Council has a relatively long distance from optimized paradigm in doing its 42 tasks. The most types of involvements in optimized model are transactional and authority while the utility of involvement has been 8.5 in average. In current condition, its involvement is estimated 6.6.

In this figure, achieved optimized autonomy


distribution from elites is shown; heterogeneity = 25, autogeneity = 25 and discretion = 50. Though data analysis, these figures are estimated for Tehran Islamic City Council: heterogeneity = 17.1, autogeneity = 17.4 and discretion = 22.1.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

The aim of present study is to provide good governance model in Tehran Islamic City Council. Good governance model is designed based on Etzioni and Lindblom's theory by polling elites and fuzzy model analysis. By such tests, governance and autonomy aspects were studied in Tehran Islamic City Council under real conditions.

The results from evaluating governance and


Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	23.72	64	23.06	8.01	26.94	Total mean



▲ Table 4.17: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of urban health aspect and optimized value (50) in discrete component

▲ Figure 4.17: comparing urban health indicators with optimized value

Sig	T	DF	Mean difference	SD	Mean	Aspects
P < 0.001	23.02	64	25.05	8.84	24.95	Total mean



▲ Table 4.18: one sample t – test to compare the tasks of governance aspect and optimized value (50) in discrete component

▲ Figure 4.18: comparing governance indicators with optimized value

power exertion in Tehran Islamic City Council Type and amount of involvement: considering five groups of tasks by Tehran Islamic City Council and 42 tasks of its affiliated organs, the findings indicate that in all groups and tasks, involvement is less than its optimized level and there is a remarkable difference in all levels. The results indicate in Tehran Islamic City Council, the lowest and highest distance from optimized level are governance and socio culture respectively.

Results from comparing autonomy distribution

Considering the purpose of the research to

provide a good governance model in Tehran Islamic City Council, it is clarified that the Council needs proper share of autonomy distribution for its governance and involvement. The values of desired autonomy distribution are determined in previous researches. According to Riggs, to create effectiveness in environment and performing its tasks, a political system should use all its potency. The combination of heterogeny and discretion would yield to maximum autogeny estimated as 100 units by Bohluli while this figure is 50 for discretion. By Riggs' presumption, the organization should purview all 100 units to be introduced

Task (number and type)	Mean	SD	Optimized level	Mean difference	T-value	Sig
1. authority	5.21	1.38	7	1.78	8.33	P < 0.001
2. authority	5.36	1.28	7	1.64	7.96	P < 0.001
3. authority	5.77	1.16	8	2.23	11.31	P < 0.001
4. transactional	5.87	1.65	7	1.13	4.25	P < 0.001
5. authority	5.95	1.48	7	1.05	4.42	P < 0.001
6. transactional	6.28	1.45	7	0.71	3.18	P < 0.003
7. persuasion	6.48	1.56	7	0.52	2.01	P < 0.052
8. authority	6.44	1.74	8	1.56	5.09	P < 0.001
9. transactional	6.72	1.72	8	1.28	4.46	P < 0.001
10. persuasion	6.61	1.79	7	0.39	1.30	P < 0.202
11. authority	6.50	1.56	10	3.50	13.07	P < 0.001
12. persuasion	6.71	1.76	8	1.29	4.32	P < 0.001
13. authority	6.50	1.34	8	1.50	7.56	P < 0.001
14. transactional	6.27	1.75	9	2.73	10.82	P < 0.001
15. authority	6.24	1.70	8	1.76	6.39	P < 0.001

▲ Table 4.19: single sample t – test to compare socio culture aspect and optimized value in involvement

Task (number and type)	Mean	SD	Optimized level	Mean difference	T-value	Sig
16. transactional	5.59	1.98	7	1.41	4.50	P < 0.001
17. transactional	5.64	1.93	7	1.36	4.07	P < 0.001
18. transactional	6.09	1.69	7	0.91	3.20	P < 0.003
19. transactional	6.17	1.50	8	1.83	7.81	P < 0.001
20. transactional	6.20	1.71	8	1.80	6.98	P < 0.001
21. authority	6.05	1.93	8	1.95	6.14	P < 0.001
22. authority	5.73	1.52	7	1.27	5.35	P < 0.001
23. transactional	6.25	1.58	7	0.75	3.13	P < 0.003

Task (number and type)	Mean	SD	Optimized level	Mean difference	T-value	Sig
27. transactional	6.37	1.80	7	0.63	2.28	P < 0.027
28. authority	6.34	1.65	7	0.66	2.55	P < 0.015
29. authority	6.29	1.36	8	1.71	8.33	P < 0.001
30. transactional	6.07	1.69	7	0.93	3.59	P < 0.001
31. transactional	6.08	1.53	7	0.92	3.77	P < 0.001

▲ Table 4.21: single sample t – test to compare urban services and environment aspect and optimized value in involvement

Task (number and type)	Mean	SD	Optimized level	Mean difference	T-value	Sig
24. transactional	6.08	1.63	8	1.92	7.37	P < 0.001
25. transactional	6.37	1.76	7	0.63	2.24	P < 0.031
26. transactional	6.02	1.91	7	0.98	3.22	P < 0.003

▲ Table 4.22: single sample t – test to compare construction, transportation and traffic aspect and optimized value in involvement

Task (number and type)	Mean	SD	Optimized level	Mean difference	T-value	Sig
32. transactional	5.98	1.35	7	1.02	4.95	P < 0.001
33. transactional	6.03	1.45	6	0.06	0.299	P < 0.767
34. persuasion	5.55	1.36	8	2.45	12.08	P < 0.001
35. persuasion	5.87	1.78	7	1.13	4.27	P < 0.001
36. transactional	6.07	1.43	8	1.93	8.80	P < 0.001
37. transactional	6.27	1.47	8	1.73	7.92	P < 0.001
38. transactional	6.48	1.13	7	0.52	3.06	P < 0.004
39. transactional	6.02	1.45	8	1.98	9.55	P < 0.001

▲ Table 4.23: single sample t – test to compare urban health aspect and optimized value in involvement

as an effective system with constructive interactions. However, the results from this research indicate that there are unused forces in Tehran Islamic City Council and the council does not use its full potency. The amount of autonomy distribution in current condition is autogeny (17.01), heterogeny (17.4) and discretion (22.1). It suggests that Tehran Islamic City Council has a long distance from optimized conditions while the distance of discretion is greater than other two ones. It means that Tehran Islamic City Council uses its capacities for good governance well. The difference is the results from this research and Riggs' indicate that an organization should utilize its full potentiality to create effectiveness while the rate of effectiveness by Tehran Islamic City Council indicates that an organization may not use its full potentiality while it is still effective. On the other hand, one can conclude that members and staff of Tehran Islamic City Council may involve in other programs and jobs and their full potentiality is not utilized. As a result, in some cases, Tehran Islamic City Council is not conducting a prop-

er activity. It means that instead of respecting tasks and missions, some employees are doing their personal affairs or have no work to do. The results from comparing autonomy distribution between the population and optimized level

Autogeny

Results of comparing autogeny distribution and society as outlined in the table:

The amount of autogeny distribution in the society indicates that the population mean in all tasks of socio culture aspect is lower than optimized level. In shows that Tehran Islamic City Council uses a very low rate of autogeny. As mentioned by Riggs' theory, autogeny is part of authorities by which Tehran Islamic City Council interacts with its internal members and uses them for its own function. Thus, Tehran Islamic City Council does not use such possibility in its relations with its internal members and it has no in-house interaction with its members which can be due to the variety and quantity of its members who have inconsistent opinion and plans and they lack synergy and

cannot use their capabilities and capacities to do their tasks. It has caused interferences in the process of governance and involvement.

Heterogeny

Considering the results in all aspect of activities by Tehran Islamic City Council, heterogeny is lower than optimized level and Tehran Islamic City Council is not in desired level in terms of interaction with environmental elements and similar organizations. According to Riggs' theory, a political system needs inter-organizational interaction to the extent that it does not effect on internal autonomy and environmental effectiveness and does not decrease them. It shows that Tehran Islamic City Council does not utilize all its capacity and capability for inter-organizational interactions and coordination which can be due to the fact that its members have their own orientations and inter-organizational harmony is dispersed. Inter-organizational interactions help Tehran Islamic City Council to recognize and remove urban challenges and problems in different areas better through cooperation with other organizations. In this regard, Tehran Islamic City Council can set policies and make them objective by the aids of public organizations and NGOs to remove such challenges.

Discretion

Comparing the results of discretion in the population and optimized model
Considering the results, real autonomies of Tehran Islamic City Council in environmental effectiveness or in posing environmental changes is lower than optimized level. It indicates that Tehran Islamic City Council does not enjoy desired autonomy in its overall organizational performance. According to Riggs' theory, the amount of discretion show the rate of organizational performance and an organization is autonomous if it has the power to make environmental changes. When an organization can be closed to optimal level, it means that it enjoys high performance and has operated successfully. Therefore, difference in optimized level and population indicate deficiency in Teh-

ran Islamic City Council in environmental effectiveness process. Considering the amount of discrete component amount, one can conclude that the amount of effectiveness by Tehran Islamic City Council in more desired than other components. It means that considering challenges and problems of involvement as well as inter/intra-organizational autogeny distribution, Tehran Islamic City Council has higher effectiveness. Unused capacity of Tehran Islamic City Council in environmental effectiveness shows lack of attention and lack of sufficient time to do the tasks which can be due different members with different opinions and tendencies and also due to their other jobs in affairs out of City Council which makes it impossible to pay enough attention and time to Tehran Islamic City Council optimistically. Considering research results and conducted comparisons with the results of previous authors, below recommendation are provided on the activities by Tehran Islamic City Council:

Since Tehran Islamic City Council does not utilize all its capacity and capability in its operations, Tehran Islamic City Council is recommended to use a transactional or persuasion involvement in its governance process and formulates and executes policies through coordination and collaboration with its internal members as well as interaction with municipality, civil society and private sector. It can be realized if Tehran Islamic City Council's members and workers act in a cross – party and synergic manner and one can establish harmony between Tehran Islamic City Council's different commissions. In the case that Tehran Islamic City Council uses transactional involvements, it should use autogeny for coordination and using its maximum potency and also heterogeny for harmonizing its programs with relevant organization. When occurred, it can maximize the amount of effectiveness or the same autogeny.

On the other hand and based on Iranian Constitution, Tehran Islamic City Council enjoys full authority in urban affairs and urban man-

agement and can submit its proposed acts to Parliament directly. However, evidences indicate that its proposed acts are approved in "Provinces Higher Council" and then are sent for Governor Generals. This process has impacted on direct effectiveness of Tehran Islamic City Council and makes barriers on its operations. It indicates the limitation of Tehran Islamic City Council's autonomy. Therefore, it is recommended that members and experts of Tehran Islamic City Council do their best in the process of approving the acts so that proposed acts are approved in the higher council and sent to Parliament. However, it needs to revise the law in Tehran Islamic City Council. Noteworthy, a broad part of challenges by Tehran Islamic City Council in performing its tasks and its effectiveness root in current domestic structural and legal problems that removing them can create needed facilities.

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